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I. Fas
Around 8:00 a.m on February 27, 1995, George Franklin Page ("Page")
began firing rifle shots out of his apartment window. The first shot pierced
Sandra McGill's fish tank in the apartment opposite Page's. When maintenance
person Ellis Hollowell tried to investigate the hole left by the first bullet, Page
fired a second shot that lodged in the apartment's exterior wall, slightly above the
maintenance person's head. Around 9:00 a.m., Page fired a third bullet into a
nearby cable van.1
Shortly thereafter, police arrived on the scene to inspect Sandra McGill's
apartment. Page fired two shots, and as the officers radioed for help, Page fired
once more. Officers John Pratt and Stephen Amos ("Amos") responded to the
request for assistance. Amos exited the automobile and was standing by the
hood when Page fired another shot through the back window of the patrol car
and into Amos's chest. Amos died, and Page surrendered to the authorities on
the condition that he first be allowed to visit Dan Pollock ("Pollock"), a clinical
psychologist who had previously treated Page. Jason Grandell ("Crandell"),
Page's psychiatrist, accompanied Page to Pollock's office.2
Before Page's trial, the North Carolina trial court denied his request for a
forensic psychiatrist's aid in preparing his defense.? The jury found Page guilty
of capital murder and recommended a death sentence; Page was sentenced to
death.' On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that
the trial court correctly denied Page's motion to access a forensic psychiatrist.'
Page applied unsuccessfully for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.
6
On appeal, Page argued he was improperlydenied a forensic psychiatrist at trial.7
Page also claimed the trial court erred by refusing him the opportunityto ascer-
tain whether the venire members understood that if he were sentenced to life, he
would be parole ineligible.8
1. State v. Page, 488 S.E.2d 225, 228 (N.C 1997).
2. Id at 229.
3. Id at 230.
4. Id at 228.
5. Id at 230.
6. Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cr. 2003).




The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to issue
a certificate of appealability ("ODA") for Page's claim regarding his opportunity
to question venire members.' Because Judge Gregory determined that a COA
should issue on Page's claim that he was improperly denied access to a forensic
psychiatrist, the Fourth Circuit heard that claim on the merits.W° Nonetheless, the
court ultimately found that the claim lacked merit and denied habeas relief."
In. A nl)is
A. Voir Dire
Page argued that the trial court's ruling, which denied his request to question
potential jurors regarding their understanding of a sentence of "life without
parole," was contrary to the United States Supreme Court's decisions in KM/y v
Sc h CQatin'2 and Simn s . v So*a Gr/re." Because the district court declined
to issue a (OA, Page needed to obtain a (OA from the Fourth Circuit before
that court could hear the claim on its merits. 4 The Fourth Circuit declined to
issue a OA "[a]s no judge on the panel believe[d] that petitioner ha[d] made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to his Smrzn
claim."1
5
B. Fornic Psy tiatr
In A ke v Cla/bcm 6 the United States Supreme Court held that:
[Wlhen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at
the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State
must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent
9. Id
10. Id at 414.
11. Id at 420.
12. 534 U.S. 246 (2002).
13. Pag 337 F.3d at 413; s&Kellyv. South Carolina, 534 US. 246,248 (2002) (holding that
due process requires that a defendant be allowed to inform the jury that he or she will be ineligible
for parole when future dangerousness is at issue and the onlysentencing options are death and life
without the possibility of parole); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 US. 154, 156 (1994) (same).
14. Pag 337 F.3d at 413; see 28 US.C S 2253(c)(1) (2000) (requiring 'a circuit justice or
judge" to issue a GOA before a petitioner may appeal the result of a federal hbea proceeding in
which the underlying detention arose from a state proceeding; part of AEDPA).
15. Pa 337 F.3d at 413;see28 US.C § 2253(c)(2) (staring that "[a] certificate of appealability
mayissue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right"; part of AEDPA); 4TH OR. R. 22(a)(3) (stating that requests to issue or
expand a 0X)A will be granted if one judge of a three-judge panel finds the applicant has made the
requisite showing under 28 US.C S 2253(c)).
16. 470 US. 68 (1985).
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psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. 7
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has interpretedAketo entitle a defendant
to psychiatric assistance when the defendant shows: "(1) he will be deprived of
a fair trial without the expert assistance, or (2) there is a reasonable likelihood
that it will materially assist him in the preparation of his case." 8 The Fourth
Circuit found that North Carolina's interpretation of Ake was reasonable and
noted its similarity to the test used by the Eleventh Ccuit, which requires a
defendant to show that an expert would aid in preparing an insanitydefense and
that the trial would be unfair without the expert's assistance. 9
Page argued thatA ke required the trial court to grant him access to afnwzic
mental health expert, in contrast to the non-forensic mental health experts he
alreadyhad available.2" The Fourth Circuit readAketo require onlythe appoint-
ment of a competent psychiatrist."' The Fourth Carcuit found that nothing in
Ake, or the court's experience, implied that non-forensic psychiatrists were
categorically not competent to aid in the preparation of an insanity defense.1
2
Page failed to produce anyevidence that indicated Drs. Crandell and Pollock, the
17. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that if a defendant's sanity during the
offense will be an issue at trial, the state must provide the defendant with access to a competent
psychiatrist).
18. Pag 337 F.3d at 415 (quoting State v. Moore, 364 S.E.2d 648, 652 (N.C 1988)).
19. Id. at 416 (quoting Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987)). Interestingly,
the Eleventh Circuit's test, which requires a defendant to show that an expert would assist the
defendant's preparation of an insanity defense and that the absence of an expert would result in an
unfair trial, appears to be more stringent than the North Carolina test, which allows the petitioner
to show one or the other. Se Moe, 809 Fid at 712 (requiring the defendant to make both
showings); Moo, 364 S.E.2d at 652 (allowing the defendant to make either showing).
20. Page, 337 F.3d at 416.
21. IR. at 417; seeWalton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442,463-65 (4th COr. 2003) (ruling that the
defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the appointment of a mental
health expert who did not believe that mitigating circumstances should offer an excuse for a crime).
The trial court in Wamn appointed Dr. Stanton Samenow ("Dr. Samenow") to be the defendant's
mental health expert, despite Dr. Samenow's unorthodox belief that mitigating circumstances are
nonexistent and therefore should not be considered in sentencing. Waka, 321 F.3d at 464. In
Watmn, the defendant's counsel failed to object to this appointment, but the court in Wam
determined that this failure to object was not ineffective assistance because the defendant did not
show that if his counsel objected the court would have appointed a new mental health expert. Id
at 464-65. Perhaps the Wakm court's finding that the trial court would not have been obliged to
appoint a different psyhaiatrist is a sign that the minimum standard of competency for a mental
alth expert under Ake is quite low in the Fourth Circuit, especially in light of the truncated
assistance to defense counsel Dr. Samenow's unorthodox beliefs would have allowed him to
provide. For a complete discussion of Wakar, see Terrence T. Egland, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.
J. 245 (2003) (analyzing Wakon v. Angelone 321 F.3d 442 (4th Cr. 2003)).
22. Pap 337 F.3d at 417.
2003]
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mental health experts who treated Page before the shootings and during the trial,
were not competent." Consequently, the Fourth Circuit upheld the Supreme
Court of North Carolina's decision.24
Page also argued that Drs. Candell and Pollock did not satisfyA ke because
theywere unable to fulfill some of the necessarypsychiatric functions envisioned
byA ke, such as testifying, examining the defendant, evaluating the strength of an
insanitydefense, and aiding the defendant's attomeyin preparing to confront the
state's expert witnesses.25 However, the court found that Page only argued that
his mental health experts did not satisfyA ke because the prosecution could have
potentially called them as fact witnesses.26 The court decided that none of a
competent psychiatrist's core A kefunctions would be compromised if the expert
were asked to testfr for the prosecution as a fact witness "independent of his or
her expert status. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found that the trial court had
granted Page access to mental health experts capable of performing the functions
contemplated in A ke and consequently denied habeas relief.
28
IV. Applicatm in Vg-'a
A. Sekeigan Extra Expert
The holding in Page creates a daunting standard for defense counsel to
overcome if they hope to convince the trial court to grant the defendant access
to an additional mental health expert. However, given the Fourth Circuit's
emphasis on Ake's requirement that defendants have access to "competent"
mental health experts, a defendant might obtain additional experts by showing
that the already-consulted experts are not competent to fulfill one or more of the
Ake functions.29 The Fourth Circuit denied relief to Page in part because he
failed to show any reason why the two experts he already had were not compe-
tent under A ke." Additionally, Judge Gregorys concurrence noted that A ke
required the state to grant defendants access to competent mental health experts,
23. Id
24. Id; se 28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (limiting federal habeas review to determining
whether the state court's conclusion was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"; part of
AEDPA).
25. Pagge 337 F.3d at 416,418 n.4; see Ake, 470 U.S. at 82 (noting the high risk of an inaccu-
rate result at trial of a sanity issue if the defense does not have a mental health expert to examine
the defendant, testify, determine viability of a sanity defense, and aide defense counsel in preparing
for cross-examination).
26. Pag, 337 F.3d at 419.
27. Id at 418 n.4.
28. Id at 419-20.
29. Id at 417.
30. Id at 419-20, 420 n.5.
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however many they might alreadyhave.3 Therefore, practitioners might obtain
access to additional mental health experts by showing that the experts already
consulted are incapable of fulfilling a particular Ake function, whereas the
sought-after expert would fulfill that function.
Although the Fourth Crcuit did not state what type of evidence would
suffice to make such a showing, the court indicated that affidavits from the
already-consulted expert, counsel, or petitioner could support a request for
additional psychiatric assistance. 2 Consequently, counsel seeking to obtain
additional experts under Ake should prepare affidavits from the already-con-
sulted experts which illustrate the need for additional experts. The affidavits
should emphasize the manner in which the sought-after expert better fulfills an
A ke function than the already-consulted expert.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held onlythat an expert's efficacy was not
undermined bytestimonyfor the State as a "fact witnesso," "independent of his
or her expert status."33 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's holding that a mental health
expert available to defendant satisfies A ke even though the expert will also testify
for the prosecution applies only to experts whose testimony will be limited to a
factual nature. It is likely that after Page the Fourth Circuit would find that an
expert whose testimonyfor the State encompassed more than just facts does not
satisfyA ke. Such a holding would certainly be consistent with A ke because an
expert who testifies for both sides on non-factual issues could probably not
adequately perform the basic Ake functions.34
B. Pmrcdural Ccxe
Practitioners should also be aware of footnote three in Page, in which the
Fourth Circuit advanced an alternate basis to deny habeas relief.3" Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 72(b) states that "[w]ithin 10 days after being served with a
copyof the recommended disposition, a partymayserve and file specific, written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations."36 The Fourth
Circuit reiterated the rule that a party that altogether neglects to object to a
magistrate's recommendations waives appellate review.17 Although the court
31. Id at 420-21 (Gregory, J., concurring).
32. SeePage 337 F.3d at 420 n.5 (describing affidavits from an expert, counsel or defendant
as the "simplest form of evidence").
33. Id at 418 n.4.
34. SeAke, 470 U.S. at 82 (explaining that a competent mental health expert should conduct
a professional evaluation of the defendant, testify, advise counsel of the viability of an insanity
defense, and help counsel prepare to cross-examine the state's mental health experts).
35. Pag, 337 F.3d at 416 n.3.
36. FED. R. av. P. 72(b) (detailing the procedure for objecting to a magistrate's decision).




acknowledged that the circuit had not yet decided whether the failure to raise
specific objections to a magistrate's recommendation also entails a forfeiture of
appellate review, it cited approvingly cases from several other circuits which
reached that result." Page only entered a general objection to the Magistrate's
decision, and the court found Page's failure to object to the magistrate's findings
with adequate particularity provided the court with another basis on which to
reject his claims." Therefore, a practitioner faced with an unfavorable recom-
mendation from a federal magistrate should object to the findings with as much
specificity as possible or face waiving the right to appeal to the Fourth Crcuit.
The court has clearly stated that a general or vague objection will not suffice to
preserve the appeal. Counsel should object with sufficient specificityto" 'focus
the district court's attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dis-
pute.' "40
Finally, Pageprovides some indication of how the Fourth Crcuit will decide
to issue (OAs in the future. Prior to Miller-El v ob4d441 the Fourth Circuit
frequentlydecided a claim against a habeas petitioner on the merits and used that
finding to justify denying a GOA.' However, in Miffer-El, the United States
Supreme Court condemned such practice and insisted that courts of appeals first
consider whether a COA should issue under 28 U.S.C S 2253(c) before examin-
ing an appeal on the merits. 3 Chief Judge Wilkins observed of the Fourth
Crcuit's pre-Mil1r-Elpractice in Reidv True." "[lit is likelythat we afforded full
review in many appeals that should have been dismissed for failure to satisfythe
38. Id (citing United States v.2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057,1060 (10th ar. 1996), Howard
v. Sec'yof Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505,508-09 (6th Cir. 1991), Lockert v. Faulkner, 843
F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1988), and Goneyv. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6-7 (3d Car. 1984)).
39. Id
40. Id (quoting 2121 E. 30th St, 73 F.3d at 1060).
41. 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
42. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-37 (2003) (forbidding courts of appeals from
deciding the merits of an appeal before deciding whether to grant an application for a (OA); see
Lyons v. Lee, 316 F.3d 528, 532-35 (4th Cr. 2003) (declining to issue a CDA after examining the
merits of the appeal);Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 309-16 (4th Cir. 2003) (same). For a complete
discussion of the discrepancy between the Fourth Circuit's procedure in]low and Lyws and the
Supreme Court's refined procedure announced in MillerEl, see Janice L. Kopec, Case Note, 15
CAP. DEF.J. 467 (2003) (analyzing Jones v. Coopr, 311 F.3d 306 (4th Cr. 2003) and Lyons v. Lee
316 F.3d 528 (4th Cr. 2003)). For a complete discussion of Miller.El, see Priya Nath, Case Note,
15 CAP. DEF.J. 407 (2003) (analyzing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. CL 1029 (2003)).
43. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 336-37; see 28 U.S.C. 2253(c) (2000) (discussing when a OA may
be issued).
44. Reid v. True, Nos. 02-27, 03-2, 2003 WL 22301063, at *1, *4 (4th Cir. Oct. 8, 2003).
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threshold requirements of S 2253(c)."45 In Suisher v Tn and Rousey v Le,"'
decided shortlyafterMifer-El, the Fourth Circuit closelyexamined the respective
petitioner's claims before declining to grant a GOA on most of their claims."' In
contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Page offered a terse one-line explanation for its
refusal to issue a COA on Page's Sirn claim." Therefore, it appears that
Suislxr and Rowey were transition cases between the Fourth Circuit's expansive
review of applications for (DAs before Mier-El and the shorter review offered
by the court in Page. It is likely that Page reflects the depth of explanation a
petitioner should generallyexpect from the Fourth rciuit's decisions concerning
COAs in the future.
V. Cvnw ion
Page primarily indicates the difficulties that a habeas petitioner will have in
convincing the Fourth Crcuit that the trial court erred by not granting the
petitioner access to mental health experts beyond petitioner's first such expert.
However, this holding is byno means absolute. If the petitioner produced some
type of evidence at trial, possibly in the form of affidavits, indicating that the
available mental health expert was somehow deficient, the Fourth Circuit may
treat the claim more favorably. Similarly, if the prosecution intended to use the
expert as a witness concerning matters beyond basic facts, the Fourth Crcuit may
be inclined to find error. Procedurally, the Fourth Circuit also warned counsel
that if they hope to preserve the right to appeal, they must follow the letter of
Rule 72(b) and speaficady object to unfavorable recommendations from a federal
magistrate.
Maxwell C Smith
45. Red, 2003 WL 22301063, at *4; se28 U.S.C S 2253(c) (2000) (stating that "(a] certificate
of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right").
46. 325 F.3d 225 (4th Cr. 2003).
47. 327 F.3d 335 (4th Cr. 2003).
48. Se Rowsey v. Lee, 327 F.3d 335, 345 (4th Cr. 2003) (granting a C(A on one of the
petitioner's claims, but denying relief on the merits thereof and declining to issue a ODA on the rest
of his claims); Swisher v. True, 325 F.3d 225, 227 (4th Gr. 2003) (declining to issue a ODA on any
of the petitioner's claims), wt dofi 123 S. Q. 2668 (2003). For a complete discussion of the
Fourth Circuit's treatment of the GOA claims in Szds/ir and Romey, see Maxwell C Smith, Case
Note, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 195 (2003) (analy-ing Swisher v. True, 325 F.3d 225 (4th Cr. 2003) and
Rowsey v. Lee, 327 F.3d 335 (4th Cr. 2003)). For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's treatment
of other OA claims in the post-Miler-El context, see Terrence T. Egland, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 309
(2003) (analyzing In re Fowies, 326 F.3d 542 (4th Cr. 2003) and In 7eW iiams, 330 F.3d 277 (4th
Car. 2003)).
49. Pag 337 F.3d at 413.
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